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“History is indeed little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of 
mankind.” 
     Gibbon--Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire 
 The economics profession has an unfortunate tendency to view recent experience 
in the narrow window provided by standard datasets.  With a few notable exceptions, 
cross-country empirical studies on financial crises typically begin in 1980 and are limited 
in other important respects. 1 Yet an event that is rare in a three decade span may not be 
all that rare when placed in a broader context. 
In my paper with Kenneth Rogoff we introduce a comprehensive new historical 
database for studying debt and banking crises, inflation, currency crashes and 
debasements.2   The data covers sixty-six countries in across all regions. The range of 
variables encompasses external and domestic debt, trade, GNP, inflation, exchange rates, 
interest rates, and commodity prices. The coverage spans eight centuries, going back to 
the date of independence or well into the colonial period for some countries. 
In what follows, I sketch some of the highlights of the dataset, with special 
reference to the current conjuncture. We note that policymakers should not be overly 
cheered by the absence of major external defaults from 2003 to 2007, after the wave of 
                                                 
1 Among many important previous studies include work by Bordo, Eichengreen, Lindert, Morton and 
Taylor. 
2 “This Time its Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises” National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper 13882, March 2008a. 
defaults in the preceding two decades.  Serial default remains the norm; major default 
episodes are typically spaced some years (or decades) apart, creating an illusion that “this 
time is different” among policymakers and investors.  We also find that high inflation, 
currency crashes, and debasements often go hand-in-hand with default.  Last, but not 
least, we find that historically, significant waves of increased capital mobility are often 
followed by a string of domestic banking crises. 
The Big Picture 
 What are some basic insights one gains from this panoramic view of the history of 
financial crises?  We begin by discussing sovereign default on external debt. 
 Default cycles 
For the world as a whole (or at least the more than 90 percent of global GDP 
represented by our dataset), the current period can be seen as a typical lull that follows 
large global financial crises.  Figure 1 plots for the years 1800 to 2006 the percentage of 
all independent countries in a state of default or restructuring during any given year.  
Aside from the current lull, one fact that jumps out from the figure are the long periods 
where a high percentage of all countries are in a state of default or restructuring.  
Indeed, there are five pronounced peaks or default cycles in the figure.  The first is during 
the Napoleonic War while the most recent cycle encompasses the emerging market debt 
crises of the 1980s and 1990s.  
Figure 1  
Sovereign External Debt: 1800-2006
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Source:  Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a). 
 
Serial default on external debt—that is, repeated sovereign default—is the norm 
throughout nearly every region in the world, including Asia and Europe. 
Our dataset also confirms the prevailing view among economists that global 
economic factors, including commodity prices and center country interest rates, play a 
major role in precipitating sovereign debt crises.  
During the past few years emerging markets have benefited from low 
international interest rates, buoyant world commodity prices and solid growth in the 
United States and elsewhere. 3  If things can’t get better—the odds are that they will get 
worse. US interest rates are likely to remain low, this helps debtor countries enormously. 
                                                 
3 See Jeffrey Frankel, “An Explanation for Soaring Commodity Prices”,  March 2008, 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1002 
Weaker growth in the US and other advanced economies soften growth prospects for 
export-dependent emerging Asia and elsewhere; inflation is on the rise. Is this cycle 
different?  
Financial liberalization, capital inflows and financial crises 
Another regularity found in the literature on modern financial crises is that 
countries experiencing large capital inflows are at high risk of having a debt crisis.  
Default is likely to be accompanied by a currency crash and a spurt of inflation.  The 
evidence here suggests the same to be true over a much broader sweep of history, with 
surges in capital inflows often preceding external debt crises at the country, regional, and 
global level since 1800, if not before. 
Also consonant with the modern theory of crises is the striking correlation 
between freer capital mobility and the incidence of banking crises, as shown in Figure 2.  
Periods of high international capital mobility have repeatedly produced international 
banking crises, not only famously as they did in the 1990s, but historically.  The figure 
plots a three-year moving average of the share of all countries experiencing banking 
crises on the right scale.  On the left scale, we employ our favored index of capital 
mobility, due to Obstfeld and Taylor (2004),4 updated and backcast using their same 
design principle, to cover our full sample period; while the index may have its 
limitations, it nevertheless provides a summary of de facto capital mobility based on 
actual flows.  
 
                                                 
4 Obstfeld, Maurice, and Alan M. Taylor, Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis, and Growth, Japan-
U.S. Center Sanwa Monographs on International Financial Markets (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004).  
 
Figure 2 
Capital Mobility and the Incidence of Banking Crisis: All Countries, 1800-
2007
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Sources:  Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a), Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), and these authors. 
 
Domestic debt and the “this time it’s different syndrome” 
As noted, our database includes long time series on domestic public debt.5   
Because historical data on domestic debt is so difficult to come by, it has been ignored in 
the empirical studies on debt and inflation.  Indeed, many generally knowledgeable 
observers have argued that the recent shift by many emerging market governments from 
external to domestic bond issues is revolutionary and unprecedented.6  Nothing could be 
further from the truth, with implications for today’s markets and for historical analyses of 
debt and inflation. 
                                                 
5 For most countries, over most of the time period considered, domestically issued debt was in local 
currency and held principally by local residents.  External debt, on the other hand, was typically in foreign 
currency, and held by foreign residents.  
6 See the IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2007; many private investment-bank reports also 
trumpet the rise of domestic debt as a harbinger of stability.   
The topic of domestic debt is so important, and the implications for existing 
empirical studies on inflation and external default are so profound, that we have broken 
out our data analysis into an independent companion piece.7   Here, we focus on a few 
major points.  The first is that contrary to much contemporary opinion, domestic debt 
constituted an important part of government debt in most countries, including emerging 
markets, over most of their existence.  Figure 3 plots domestic debt as a share of total 
public debt over 1900 to 2006. For our entire sample, domestically issued debt averages 
more than 50 percent of total debt for most of the period.  Even for Latin America, the 
domestic debt share is typically over 30 percent and has been at times over 50 percent.   
Furthermore, contrary to the received wisdom, these data reveal that a very 
important share of domestic debt—even in emerging markets— was long-term maturity.   
Figure 3  
Domestic  Public Debt as a Share of Total Debt, 
1900-2006
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7 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff Domestic Debt: The Forgotten History,” NBER Working 
Paper 13946, April 2008b.   
 
 
The inflation-default cycles  
Figure 4 on inflation and external default (1900 to 2006) illustrates the striking 
correlation between the share of countries in default on debt at one point and the number 
of countries experiencing high inflation (which we define to be inflation over 20 percent 
per annum).  Thus, there is a tight correlation between the expropriation of residents and 
foreigners. 
As noted, investment banks and official bodies, such as the International 
Monetary Fund, alike have argued that even though total public debt remains quite high 
today in many emerging markets, the risk of default on external debt has dropped 
dramatically because the share of external debt has fallen. 
Figure 4 
 Inflation and External Default: 1900-2006
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This conclusion seems to be built on the faulty premise that countries will treat domestic 
debt as junior, bullying domestics into accepting lower repayments or simply defaulting 
via inflation.  The historical record, however, suggests that a high ratio of domestic to 
external debt in overall public debt is cold comfort to external debt holders.   Default 
probabilities depend much more on the overall level of debt. 
Policy Issues 
This brings us to our central theme—the “this time is different syndrome.”  There 
is a view today that both countries and creditors have learned from their mistakes.  
Thanks to better-informed macroeconomic policies and more discriminating lending 
practices, it is argued, the world is not likely to again see a major wave of defaults.  
Indeed, an often-cited reason these days why “this time it’s different” for the emerging 
markets is that governments. are managing the public finances better, albeit often thanks 
to a benign global economic environment and extremely favorable terms of trade shocks. 
Such celebration may be premature.  Capital flow/default cycles have been around 
since at least 1800—if not before.  Technology has changed, the height of humans has 
changed, and fashions have changed. Yet the ability of governments and investors to 
delude themselves, giving rise to periodic bouts of euphoria that usually end in tears, 
seems to have remained a constant. 
On a more positive note, our research at least raises the question of how a country 
might “graduate” from a history of serial default.  Interesting cases include Greece and 
Spain, countries that appear to have escaped a severe history of serial default not only by 
reforming institutions, but by benefiting from the anchor of the European Union.  Austria, 
too, managed to emerge from an extraordinarily checkered bankruptcy history by closer 
integration with post-war Germany, a process that began even before European 
integration began to accelerate in the 1980s and 1990s. We shall wait and see which 
emerging markets can graduate from serial default.   
